Only a few days are left before the elections in Georgia. The elections are not easy, because the pro-European foreign policy vector is under threat for the first time in the country’s modern history. Although the ruling party will not admit it, it is obvious to all analysts that if the Georgian Dream wins, the country will not be able to maintain working relations with the EU and the US at the level of integration, which means that Russia will fill the resulting geopolitical void with its Russian world.
According to surveys commissioned by two opposition TV companies, Formula and Mtavari, the ruling party will gain no more than 35 percent. With this result, the government is formed by three opposition parties that have signed President Salome Zurabishvili’s Georgian Charter. The Georgian Charter is President Salome Zurabishvili’s action plan aimed at uniting the opposition to oppose the government in the parliamentary elections. Salome Zurabishvili announced the Georgian Charter on Georgia’s Independence Day, 26 May 2024.
According to the Charter, all opposition parties that have signed the Charter will participate in the parliamentary elections on 26 October. The Charter does not oblige the signatories to form a unified coalition before the elections. After the elections, the opposition will form an interim government that will implement reforms to bring the country closer to Europe, after which regular parliamentary elections will be scheduled. The plan calls for the repeal of laws that contradict European recommendations and sweeping reforms. Giorgi Gakharia’s For Georgia party was the last to sign the Presidential Charter. The reasons for Gakharia’s stalling to the last are understandable, unlike other opposition forces, Gakharia expects to draw supporters of the Georgian Dream to his side. After all, it was he who headed the GD list in the 2020 parliamentary elections.
The Charter, the guarantor of which is the President of Georgia, unites all major opposition parties of Georgia. Here it is important to note before whom and based on what Salome Zurabishvili guarantees ‘correct’ behavior of political forces both during the elections – rejection of mutual criticism, and afterward, first of all, it is about rejection of coalition with the ruling party and fulfilling the requirements of the Charter, up to holding early elections in a normal electoral environment. According to the Constitution of Georgia, the President has no power, however, it is Zurabishvili who represents on the political field of Georgia the very Europe that the opposition forces aspire to and on whom it depends whether after the elections Georgia will continue to remain on the European political field or will be excluded from the processes of European integration. And it is her opinion, as an arbiter among the opposition, that the European Commission and other EU institutions will listen to when assessing the activities of both political forces and individual politicians.
In fact, the option of forming a transitional government is the most favorable way out of the political deadlock into which the Georgian Dream has put the country since the spring of this year. This will allow the cancellation of a number of laws that make European integration practically impossible, fulfil the EU recommendations and, after new elections, open membership negotiations with the European Union.
The ruling party will remain in the political field and will continue to be the most serious political force in the country, possessing the most serious financial (Ivanishvili’s capital) and political resources (almost all municipalities will remain in the hands of the ruling party). In case of recognizing defeat, the ruling party will have essentially nothing to show for it. There is no way to ban it and subject it to political persecution, as it would contradict the democratic course of the country. And there will most likely be no consensus on this issue among the three political forces in the coalition.
The risks associated with this scenario include foreign policy risks emanating from Russia. The option of direct military aggression is unlikely; the Russians simply do not have sufficient military resources to conquer and hold Georgia. Moreover, any attempt to occupy Georgia will lead to a sharp increase in military and political support for Ukraine both from the US and the European Union, and will sow fear and, at the same time, centrifugal tendencies in the post-Soviet countries.
Internal provocations by Russian agents and groups under their control are most likely. Under these circumstances, it is in the interest of the authorities to stop such provocations, as any bloodshed, which can be blamed on the authorities, will wipe out all prospects of the Georgian Dream to remain on the political field and make it inevitable that politicians belonging to this political force will be persecuted by the West. I do not think that the authorities do not realise the very undesirable consequences of such a scenario. Another thing is how high the level of infiltration of Russian special services in the institutions of power in Georgia is and whether the current government can resist them.
Another option: the ruling Georgian Dream party in coalition with at least two opposition parties. This option is less preferable, as there are no guarantees that the 2024 laws will be cancelled, and without their cancellation Georgia will inevitably be cut off from the West, and Russia will certainly take advantage of the political vacuum created.
However, if in this scenario the authorities agree to repeal all anti-European laws they have adopted, they will have a chance to get out of a difficult situation and normalise relations with the West to a more or less acceptable level.
It is difficult to hope for any progress under such circumstances, let’s not forget that the parties that would go for a coalition with the ruling party would violate the Charter supported by the European Union. The only thing that can be hoped for under such circumstances is to maintain the appearance of ties under very strict monitoring of the policy of the Georgian authorities towards Russia. Under these circumstances, the Georgian authorities become undesirable partners for the West, and useless for Russia. Nevertheless, according to my information, the leaders of the Georgian Dream are making energetic attempts to reach an agreement with the U.S., including through the leaders of the post-Soviet countries.
According to surveys commissioned by the pro-government TV company Imedi, Georgian Dream is gaining more votes than all other parties and is capable of forming a government on its own. It is clear that the credibility of this research is much lower than the polls above. However, let us assume that the elections will end with such a result.
The first is a Georgian Dream victory with a small level of fraud of five to seven per cent, and moderate use of violence on election day. This option is possible with a low voter turnout of up to 60 per cent, provided that the GD brings its voters to the polling stations in an organised manner. In this case, the GD would also have the option of abandoning the spring-summer laws and starting a negotiation process with the west. In this case, the GD has the option to freeze the process of breaking relations with the west at the current level. This is a very fragile structure of relations that is likely to collapse at the first crisis. But even this option is much better than all the others.
The second option is a victory of the GD with a level of falsification above 7%, with medium or high levels of violence on election day. In this case, the field for negotiations with the West narrows to a minimum. Mass protests are almost inevitable, and here we should consider several options for the development of events in the protest field.
Note that the most massive rallies were held in Georgia against the law on foreign agents, but there were no demands for a change of power there. The pre-election rally of the opposition took place on a much more modest scale, although it was the largest pre-election rally, comparable only to the opposition rally of 2012. It is impossible to predict what will happen if the number of people comparable to that in the spring of 2024 unites to demand the government’s departure, while the level of legitimacy of the government with extensive falsifications, confirmed by numerous observers, will be minimal. Both sides are ready to use violence, but it should be taken into account that society categorically does not accept violent actions.
As for the actions of external forces, for Russians, the issue of Georgia’s position in Russia’s economic and political ecosystem is fundamentally important. Loss of influence in Georgia means not just possible logistical (in the broadest sense of the word) isolation in this direction, but also activation of horizontal projects with very limited prospects for Russian north-south projects. Another factor is that of Georgia’s neighbors. If today Azerbaijan and Armenia behave extremely cautiously towards Moscow, knowing perfectly well that in the near future their geographical interaction with the outside world, at least for some time, will be decided in Moscow, in case of Russia’s defeat in the struggle for Georgia, they will inevitably change their policy in relations with Moscow.
As far as the US is concerned, the emergence of another, new crisis just before the presidential election will be a severe blow to the current administration and will inevitably be the focus of the election campaign. It would certainly force the administration to act. It will depend on the outcome of the election, but regardless of the outcome, the loss of Georgia will be seen as a geopolitical slap in the face by any U.S. administration. Although GD will have more opportunities to back down in case of Trump’s victory.
And finally, the European Union, for whom a victory of GD in the Georgian crisis would mean that Moscow would take control of the only safe land corridor with China and India, and would put an end to the EU’s ambitions in Central Asia, which are also quite large.
There is another scenario in which the ruling party or opposition parties get a majority of seats in parliament, but less than 100. The thing is that 100 MPs out of 150 are needed for the parliament to start working. And if there are not 100 MPs, i.e. if the losers boycott the parliament, it will be a crisis and new elections will be scheduled for next spring.
Here’s where things stand for now. We’ll see what happens next on October 26th.
Gela Vasadze, MPIC
