Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, as countries located in the South Caucasus, differ significantly in terms of the level of security cooperation with the European Union.
The nation states which comprise the South Caucasus do not have a common, collective defence system. This is primarily due to historical events and the political naïveté of local elites.
In the event of possible aggression, only Azerbaijan can count 100% on external assistance, because on June 5, 2021, Turkey and Azerbaijan officially established a military alliance. The presidents of both countries symbolically signed a memorandum in the city of Shusha, providing for mutual military assistance in the event of a threat to territorial integrity from third countries. The agreement also covers the expansion of cooperation in the defence industry. Türkiye also promised its support in the reconstruction of the destroyed Karabakh. Furthermore, according to the agreement, Türkiye may deploy permanent military bases in Azerbaijan. Cooperation between these countries is strong, and numerous military exercises confirm excellent cooperation in the field of security. According to the agreement, the Azerbaijani army will meet the standards of the Turkish army by the end of 2025. This means that the Azerbaijani army will meet NATO standards, because Turkey is a member of the Alliance and trains its soldiers in accordance with the standards applicable in this organization. The process of standardizing the AZ army with the canons of NATO troops, given the still good (and even positive) relations with Russia, raises the question on the current situation of Baku’s actual intentions after 2025. (If we assume that the process of reaching an agreement with Armenia may be more advanced than it is now), and especially whether it will not be a “Trojan horse” in the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance. However, this is a problem that will always appear at the early stage of including countries that have been under Russian control for a long time into the sphere of Western influence, and it is impossible to escape from it. Moreover, apart from this issue, the AZ army will receive a very large range of opportunities. Neither Georgia nor Armenia has such comfort.
Theoretically, Georgia could count on help from Western countries. Georgia has signed a Charter on Strategic Partnership with the US, but in view of recent events and mass protests against the adoption of the Act on Foreign Agents (assessed by local society and international opinion as a pro-Russian Act), it is unlikely that Western countries will take action to provide possible military assistance in the event of foreign aggression against that country. According to the principle “may the closest protect you.” The fact that Georgia received EU candidate status last year does not change anything here.
Armenia also does not have a reliable ally. Until the war with Azerbaijan (the so-called “Second Karabakh War”) in 2020, Russia seemed to be Armenia’s ally. 1st military alliance in the Collective Security Treaty Organization – ODKB. In addition to Armenia and Russia, the organization also includes Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. However, Russia “failed” this test. An even greater disappointment was the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh under the official control of Baku in 2023. The end of the mission of the so-called Russian peacekeeping forces in the region in 2024 filled the cup of bitterness. Theoretically, France could be a defence ally. However, as of today, apart from minor military assistance (the transfer of several dozen “Bastion” IFVs in 2023), the authorities in Paris are limited only to moral support for Yerevan. Of course, Azerbaijan is reluctant to France and, through its main partner, Turkey, is lobbying for Paris not to actively engage in supporting Yerevan.
So Russia turned out to be Armenia’s ally only on paper. Moscow took no action in 2020 to help fighting Armenia. To make matters worse, in 2021, Russia took USD 400 million from Armenia in exchange for promises to provide weapons to the Armenian army. To this day, Moscow has not fulfilled its obligations in this regard.
There is also no unity between the European Union and NATO regarding what policy Europe and the US should pursue towards the South Caucasus countries in order to keep this area (looking at whole context) in relative peace and gradually bring it closer to the West.
Four EU approaches to the countries of the region can be observed:
1. Individual to each country. e.g. to Azerbaijan as a source of gas and oil supplies;
2. Collective, as per region. Implementation of joint projects for Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, e.g. in the field of energy, renewable energy, communication and transport routes;
3. Approach to the union of two countries. For example: to Armenia and Georgia as potential future members of the European Union. Or an approach to Azerbaijan and Georgia as countries important from the point of view of communication and transfer of natural resources from Central Asia (Medium Corridor).
4. Combinatory, mixed approach.
In this context, it seems that the Three Seas countries have a specific, significant potential to start playing a more important role in the region in the near future, provided that they develop a common policy towards the South Caucasus countries, including the sphere of regional security.
As for the security of the entire region, the Three Seas concept does not say anything directly about it. However, it is worth emphasizing that cooperation between the Three Seas countries in the field of security and combating terrorism is important and constitutes one of the main aspects of the functioning and implementation of this idea. It should be emphasized that the experience of the “Three Seas” participants in this area has been significantly deepening recently. And this may be a starting point for extending this initiative to three Transcaucasian countries. In such a case, the “Three Seas” could transform into either the “Three Seas plus” or the “Four Seas”, because the Adriatic, Baltic and Black Seas would become the Caspian Sea.
The Caspian Sea, as the largest lake in the world, located on the border of Europe and Asia, is an important source of energy raw materials, such as crude oil and natural gas, and these raw materials are highly sought after on the European market. Also, the implementation of the idea of including the Caucasus area in the “Three Seas” concept could certainly accelerate the implementation of the so-called ‘middle’ corridor.
Perhaps it is worth treating Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia as a whole in this context.
And propose including the entire region in the implementation of the Three Seas Initiative. In that case, we would be dealing with something like the “Three Seas Plus”. Or as I noted earlier with the extension of the Three Seas to the Four Seas. I am thinking here about extending the concept not only to the countries of the South Caucasus but also to the countries of Central Asia, such as Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan. Starting with the idea of supporting the fight against terrorism in individual countries of the Caucasus or Central Asia, it constitutes a fairly safe seed for the gradual encouragement and rapprochement of the Three Seas countries with the countries of the South Caucasus. Tightening cooperation with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia can be done using the existing contacts and cooperation, such as economic cooperation on the multilateral or bilateral level, as the EU in relations with individual countries from the mentioned regions.
The implementation of knowledge and capabilities in the field of combating terrorism, or the expansion of specific security elements, such as cybersecurity, and the exchange of experiences in this regard, can positively serve to strengthen relations with countries from the South Caucasus and Central Asia. And this may gradually influence the interest of these countries in greater participation in the initiatives of Western countries. This type of implementation is, it should be emphasized, much easier to implement than, for example, entering strategic military alliances and actively becoming a participant or member of these countries in the defence sphere. The Three Seas Initiative is already attracting countries that were apparently not interested in it. Just mention Greece, North Macedonia and even Japan. The Three Seas is able to increase the security of the entire South Caucasus region. The benefits are obvious. This should also be an important attraction for countries from the South Caucasus or Central Asia. Moreover, it is certainly easier to aspire and find understanding and acceptance among other member states when trying to join this initiative than, for example, being a party to a long-term application process, such as in the EU or NATO. Georgia has negative experience in this matter (because Georgia has been waiting for an invitation to join NATO since 2008).
To conclude, the Three Seas initiative will naturally expand. Creating a vector for this enlargement that will include the South Caucasus and Central Asia may bring many benefits to both sides and, importantly, marginalize Russia’s role in those regions, and this is what we should strive for as a consequence.
Andrzej Klimczyk, MPIC
